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Diversity and Postmaterialism as Rival Perspectives in Accounting 
for Social Solidarity: Evidence from International Surveys 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the empirical support for the two rival perspectives of 
diversity and postmaterialism, each of which predicts different patterns and 
trends of social solidarity in the western world. The diversity perspective holds 
that ethnocultural heterogeneity undermines social solidarity, and 
consequently expects social solidarity to be weaker in more heterogeneous 
societies. In the diversity logic, social solidarity should have declined in 
western societies as these societies have become more diverse due to 
continuous immigration. Postmaterialism theory, by contrast, posits a positive 
link between postmaterialism and social solidarity, and would expect social 
solidarity to have increased because of rising levels of postmaterialism across 
the western world. This paper found no relation between diversity and social 
solidarity at either the individual or the national level in cross-sectional 
analyses of WVS and EVS survey data. Neither was the diversity argument 
supported by trend data on opinions about the poor. The positive relations 
between postmaterialism and social solidarity on the other hand did confirm 
the postmaterialism perspective. Still, as postmaterialism contributed little to 
explaining the variance in social solidarity at the individual level and as there 
was no connection between postmaterialism and social solidarity at the 
macro-level, it can be questioned whether the solidaristic sentiments 
expressed by postmaterialists are sufficiently deep and lasting to underpin 
robust welfare policies.  
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Introduction 
Many policy makers and academics are currently concerned about declining levels of 
social solidarity in modern Western societies. People are less willing than before to 
contribute to welfare policies that benefit the poor and needy, it is believed. Diversity 
is seen by many as the root cause of this alleged process. Diversity within a society, 
so the argument goes, makes it difficult for citizens to see fellow citizens of a 
different ethnic, cultural or racial background as part of „us‟. This in turn is said to 
affect the willingness of these citizens to pay for welfare arrangements benefiting 
these culturally different co-citizens (e.g. Goodhart 2004). As western societies are 
becoming increasingly diverse due to immigration and low birth rates of the native 
majority, public support for social welfare is inevitably diminishing, it is claimed.  
The literature on the link between diversity and social solidarity has expanded 
rapidly in recent years. Proponents of the view that the former has a negative impact 
on the latter often base their claims on race relations research in America and argue 
that European countries will adopt a more American-style welfare regime as their 
societies evolve towards American levels of cultural/racial diversity (e.g. Alesina and 
Glaeser 2004). Others, by contrast, have argued that enduring political and 
institutional differences between Europe and America will prevent European societies 
from going the American way (e.g. Taylor-Gooby 2005). Again others claim that 
multicultural policies respecting difference and endorsing minority cultures are not 
necessarily undermining social solidarity as long as they also promote overarching 
loyalties based on common liberal values (e.g. Banting et al 2006).  
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Although all these studies make claims about the impact of cultural diversity 
on the beliefs and attitudes of people regarding social security and redistribution, only 
a few actually examine these beliefs. Instead, most of them focus on the provision of 
public welfare. But the level of welfare spending is not just a reflection of public 
opinion as expressed through the ballot box. It also depends on economic 
performance and on the ability of the state to find resources to finance welfare 
policies with. In other words, people may desire generous welfare arrangements, but 
the state may not be able to afford them (any longer). This argument is in fact often 
made by globalization theorists: contrary to public preferences, states are forced to cut 
back on welfare programs to reduce costs and keep their economies competitive in an 
increasingly global market of goods, services, capital and people (Cox 1993; Ohmae 
1990). Low spending on welfare therefore need not always indicate low levels of 
social solidarity. In this sense, the study of beliefs and attitudes offers a more direct 
and less biased way of measuring social solidarity than an analysis of welfare 
spending.  
Another omission in the diversity literature concerns the negligence of theories 
predicting quite different patterns and trajectories of social solidarity. Thus we cannot 
know from this literature whether the diversity theory outperforms other rival theories 
in accounting for these patterns and trajectories. In this paper we will focus on one of 
these rival theories: the culture shift argument advanced by Ronald Inglehart. In brief, 
this theory asserts that modernization and in particular the shift from industrial to 
post-industrial modes of production has led to an intergenerational process of cultural 
change away from materialist to postmaterialist values in advanced western societies. 
Social solidarity is seen by Inglehart as a component of this postmaterialism. It is 
interesting to contrast postmaterialism with the diversity argument as the two predict 
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diverging trajectories: while diversity theory expects social solidarity to diminish 
because of growing cultural, ethnic and racial heterogeneity in western populations, 
postmaterialism theory would expect it to increase as part of the ongoing shift towards 
postmaterialist values.  
The objective of this paper is twofold. It first aims at providing a critical 
discussion of the diversity perspective highlighting several issues that the advocates 
of this perspective have overlooked, particularly in relation to social solidarity. 
Second, it seeks to assess the empirical claims of the two perspectives regarding 
social solidarity by analysing public opinion data on welfare, poverty and 
redistribution. We will argue that these data mostly support the postmaterialism 
perspective and refute the diversity argument. However, we also question whether the 
altruism expressed by postmaterialists is sufficiently deep and enduring to sustain 
solidarity levels. The next section outlines the diversity argument in further detail and 
presents the research evidence its advocates have brought forward. It then proceeds 
with a critique of the diversity argument. Subsequently, the paper discusses the 
postmaterialist perspective and its relation to social solidarity. This is followed by a 
subsection discussing the definition of the dependent variable - social solidarity and 
presenting three research questions aimed at exploring the relations between the two 
rival perspectives and social solidarity. The third section reviews the indicators and 
data sources used to measure the main concepts. Subsequently the research questions 
are explored in analyses of trends and cross-sectional analyses at the micro and 
macro-levels. The concluding section summarizes the main findings and highlights 
several limitations of the postmaterialist argument in relation to social solidarity.   
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Diversity, postmaterialism and social solidarity 
 
Diversity 
 
The diversity argument comes in various guises. Central in one version is the notion 
of trust. Citizens, it is argued, will only be prepared to pay for redistributive policies if 
they are confident that the recipients of welfare provisions will one day return the 
favour when they are in need. Thus, a community paying for and enjoying generous 
welfare services is a community of trust, reciprocity and mutual obligation (Miller 
1995; 2004). Cultural diversity within a political community undermines trust because 
people will not feel the same level of commitment to the cultural other as to people of 
their own stock. This lack of commitment across cultural borders fuels suspicion that 
people of a different culture will show free-rider behaviour or will exploit the welfare 
system to the benefit of their own cultural group. Another version of the diversity 
argument approaches the issue from an evolutionary perspective and shifts the focus 
to ethnic groups. It argues that altruism is primarily directed at one‟s co-ethnics and 
rarely extends to ethnic others. That altruism has taken this form is because clans and 
tribes with internal mutual support schemes have outperformed groups lacking these 
support systems in the struggle for survival. The consequence of this natural selection 
process is that human beings today have a genetic propensity to favour their ethnic kin 
(Salter 2004). In this perspective, multiethnic societies will continue to be troubled by 
faulty welfare systems, ethnic nepotism and ethnic conflict.  
 However the diversity argument is elaborated theoretically, its advocates have 
marshalled an impressive amount of research evidence in support of their claims. 
Most of this research relates to the United States, where a series of studies have found 
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a negative relation between ethnic or racial heterogeneity and (support for) welfare 
expenditures at the city or state level (e.g. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1997; Hero and 
Tolbert 1996; Luttmer 2001). The work of Gilens (1999) and Luttmer (2001) is 
particularly interesting for this study as these authors focused exclusively on public 
opinion. Gilens (1999) found that negative opinions about blacks coincide with anti- 
welfare attitudes. Combining tract level data from the census and public opinion data 
from the General Social Survey, Luttmer, moreover, discovered that white support for 
welfare spending diminishes as the proportion of black recipients of welfare in the 
tract population increases. This result indicates that racial heterogeneity seems to be 
particularly harmful for social solidarity if racial cleavages coincide with social 
inequalities. Focusing on Canada, Soroka, Johnston and Banting (2004) established 
that interpersonal trust diminishes as the proportion of visible minorities in census 
tracts increases, and that trust in turn is positively linked to support for social 
programmes. Yet, they also found the direct relation between the proportion of visible 
minorities and support for welfare arrangements to be weak. Trust was thus the 
crucial intermediate factor linking the two ultimate variables in their analysis. The 
link between diversity and (support for) welfare arrangements has also been explored 
cross-nationally. For Africa, Easterly and Levine (1997) have found a strong negative 
correlation between a country‟s ethnic heterogeneity and public investment in 
schooling and infrastructure. Using a sample of 47 countries across all continents, 
Sanderson (2004) discovered that ethnic diversity was still negatively correlated to 
welfare expenditures after having controlled for GNP per capita, level of democracy, 
labour organization and party fractionalization.  
Finally, an important contribution to the cross-national work on diversity and 
welfare policies has been Alesina and Glaeser‟s (2004) recent book Fighting Poverty 
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in the US and Europe: A World of Difference. Comparing the very different welfare 
regimes in the US and Europe, Alesina and Glaeser argue that redistributive policies 
are mainly a function of political institutions, ideology, geography, and ethnic and 
racial heterogeneity. However, they only consider the latter two to be the true first 
causes. In their view, America‟s geographic isolation, low population density, vast 
size and ethnic diversity have severely handicapped the development of a powerful 
unified workers movement there. This in turn meant that organized labour could not 
challenge existing political institutions benefiting the well-off and enforce social 
welfare policies. Moreover, the coincidence of racial cleavages with social 
inequalities (black=poor; white=affluent) fuelled a racist anti-welfare ideology which 
blames the poor themselves for being poor. In this way geography and diversity 
combined to prevent the establishment of generous welfare schemes. In densely 
populated Europe, by contrast, the strong ethnically homogenous labour movements 
seized the moment in the chaotic aftermath of World War I to force through welfare 
arrangements and proportional representation in a good number of countries. To 
support their argument, Alesina and Glaeser present a regression analysis showing 
that racial heterogeneity is negatively linked to social welfare expenditures with GDP 
per capita held constant. As European societies move to American levels of racial 
inequalities, they ominously warn, so a combined anti-welfare / anti-immigrant 
ideology will gain in strength in many European countries, and consequently support 
for the welfare state will erode.  
Notwithstanding all this evidence, the diversity argument and its link to social 
solidarity can be criticised on a number of grounds, which highlights the need to 
consider an alternative perspective. The first criticism relates to the durability of 
cultural, ethnic and racial cleavages. The advocates of the diversity argument 
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implicitly assume these cleavages to be lasting realities of social life. However, from 
the literature on nationalism and ethnic group mobilization we know that there is 
nothing natural and fixed about ethnic boundaries (McKay 1981). Culture, ethnicity 
and race are as much a social construction as the other institutions of society, and as 
such they are closely interlinked with socio-economic processes and interest 
constellations. Many scholars have pointed to the strategic use of ethnic symbols by 
politicians and common people alike in their efforts to gain access to political and 
economic resources (e.g. Glazer and Moynihan 1975; van den Berghe 1976). As 
interest configurations change along with the socio-economic restructuring of society, 
so cultural and ethnic boundaries are likely to follow. Indeed, a brief review of 
cultural developments in post-war Western Europe reveals that the ethnic cleavage 
(native majority versus immigrant minorities) has replaced the religious divide 
(Protestants, Catholics and seculars) as the most salient fissure in a number of 
societies. In recent years, the religious divide seems to once again come to the 
foreground given the centrality of Islam and liberal democratic values in the public 
debate. In the United States, too, cultural cleavages that once divided the worker 
movement have rapidly dissolved after World War II. Each change in salience of 
ethno-cultural markers involves the creation of new in- and out-groups and makes 
society appear more homogenous or heterogeneous. Thus, the fissures the diversity 
perspective holds to be so permanent can be highly dynamic and contingent on other 
circumstances. The theory therefore runs the risk of focusing on symptoms rather than 
underlying causes. 
Secondly, and related to the first criticism, some supporters of the diversity 
thesis have argued that heterogeneity mainly links negatively with social solidarity 
when ethno-cultural boundaries concur with socio-economic cleavages (e.g. Alesina 
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and Glaeser 2004; Luttmer 2001). Alesina and Glaeser for instance note that the 
relative economic equality of Catholics and Protestants in Germany has made it 
difficult for political entrepreneurs to exploit religious or regional divisions. The 
invocation of social fractures, however, dilutes the diversity argument. Apparently, 
ethno-cultural diversity need not produce declining support for the welfare state by 
itself. Indeed, a closer look at the analysis done by Luttmer (2001) (see above) 
supports this conjecture: while white support for welfare was negatively linked with 
the percentage of black recipients of welfare, it was positively correlated with the 
percentage of blacks as a whole in the census tract population (see the results of the 
regression analysis on page 507 of his article). For some reason, Luttmer chose not to 
highlight the last-named correlation in his interpretations of the analysis. The finding 
however is of crucial importance. It means that diversity – also of a racial kind – and 
social solidarity are not necessarily at odds with one another under conditions of 
socio-economic equality. 
While the first two criticisms concern the independent variable (diversity), the 
third reservation pertains to the dependent variable (social solidarity) in the diversity 
argument. The advocates of the diversity school often fail to distinguish between 
support for the welfare state and social solidarity, treating these concepts as 
synonyms. Welfare state support, however, need not only be an expression of social 
solidarity. It may equally well be motivated by rational self-interest. This is the 
perspective that Pierson (2001) for instance adopts in his analysis of the restructuring 
welfare state. In his view, demographic changes in post-industrial societies have 
generated new pressures on the welfare state. One of these new pressures is the 
steadily aging population, which has generated powerful interest groups fighting for 
the retention of costly pensions and health care systems. Similarly, the expanding 
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inclusion of women in the workforce has led to growing demands for state-financed 
parental leave and childcare arrangements. Contrary to the diversity argument, which 
predicts declining support for welfare arrangements, Pierson‟s theory assumes that the 
social security system faces new demands and that these demands are on the rise.  
The insight that support for the welfare state may well be driven by rational 
self-interest casts doubt on the claim of some observers that the expansion of the 
welfare state in the 1950s and 60s was conditioned on the national homogeneity of 
society and the feelings of ethnic solidarity this generated (e.g. Wolfe and Klausen 
2000). Far from presenting society as a harmonious whole of like-minded individuals 
with strong national loyalties, this insight draws attention to competing groups within 
society struggling with one another in the pursuit of their interests. Indeed, the idea 
that the post-war welfare state is the product of combat rather than peaceful ethnic 
solidarity dominates the welfare literature. Many scholars, for instance, have 
documented the struggle of organized labour to wrest concessions from the ruling 
classes and establish redistribution and welfare schemes (e.g. Esping Anderson 1985; 
Flora and Heidenheimer 1981; Korpi 1989). Stephens (2001) notes that the more 
often socialist parties were part of the government, the more generous the welfare 
state has become. Even in countries where the initiative to adopt welfare policies has 
not come from organized labour (e.g. in Bismarck Germany), it is doubtful whether 
the rulers responsible for their introduction were motivated first of all by ethnic 
solidarity. They may have done so to pre-empt social unrest, stop the growth of the 
socialist movement and keep the working classes in check. Scholars of neo-Marxist 
persuasion, for instance, have argued that state welfare policies were predominantly 
an instrument of control for the ruling classes (e.g. Ginsburg 1979; Poulantzas 1978). 
Others have argued that it was „enlightened‟ self-interest that prompted the well-off to 
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establish the first welfare arrangements in the nineteenth century (e.g. De Swaan 
1988). Thus, it is doubtful whether groups being net contributors to the welfare state 
have ever supported redistribution wholeheartedly, even if they shared ethnicity with 
the recipients of welfare. In homogenous societies feelings of solidarity with fellow 
citizens of different socio-economic status may therefore be as weak as in 
heterogeneous societies, which is not what the diversity argument would expect. The 
possibility that public welfare levels could well reflect the strength of organised 
interest groups moreover casts further doubt on the suitability of using of social 
spending as a proxy of social solidarity, which, as we pointed out above, is what most 
of the diversity literature does.  
Interestingly, even if the diversity argument were correct and support for and 
the provision of welfare arrangements would indeed be an expression of social 
solidarity, the theory could still be criticised for understanding social solidarity in a 
very restricted sense. People, it is claimed, are only prepared to contribute to welfare 
schemes if they are confident that one day they will be able to benefit from these 
schemes themselves. In other words, it is the expectation of reciprocity rather than 
disinterested altruism that underpins pro-welfare attitudes. If people no longer trust 
their fellow citizens to reciprocate, their willingness to pay for welfare arrangements 
will disappear, it is believed. Scholars, however, have noted that people often help 
others without expecting anything in return (De Beer 2005a, Koopmans 2006). 
Donations to charities, volunteers, missionaries and human aid workers are all 
manifestations of this kind of unilateral solidarity. If support for the welfare state is 
motivated more by unilateral than by reciprocal solidarity, the process of a steady 
declining willingness to contribute to welfare policies, as predicted by cultural 
diversity theory, is unlikely to happen.    
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Postmaterialism 
 
In view of these theoretical criticisms it is illuminating to present an alternative 
perspective which predicts entirely different trends in social solidarity. As noted in the 
introduction, this the postmaterialist value change theory elaborated by Inglehart 
(1990, 1997) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005). Inspired by Maslow‟s (1954) hierarchy 
of needs idea, this theory holds that the post-war socio-economic development in the 
western world has generated a process of value change through the mechanism of 
generation replacement. At its heart, the theory postulates that the circumstances in 
which people grow up have a decisive impact on their beliefs and attitudes. People 
who had to endure poverty and deprivation in their formative years are likely to 
develop values stressing physical and economic security (so-called materialist or 
survival values). By contrast, people who spent their childhood years in affluence are 
more prone to internalize values emphasizing autonomy, emancipation, equality and 
personal development (so-called post-materialist or self-expression values). Whereas 
the former tend to view cultural difference, gender equality and alternative lifestyles 
as threatening, the latter value diversity positively, seeing it as a source of learning 
and personal enrichment. As the younger generations have grown up in ever better 
conditions after World War II, so we should see a steady move towards 
postmaterialism across all advanced post-industrial societies, with older, more 
materialist cohorts being replaced by younger, more post-materialist generations 
(Inglehart 1997, p. 140; Inglehart and Welzel 2005, p. 132). In a graph showing inter-
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cohort differences over time, Inglehart (1990, p. 85) provides evidence for this 
process of value change. 
Inglehart is only brief about the consequences of value change for social 
solidarity. This is surprising as one could very well imagine the two to be related. 
Postmaterialists, it may be argued, have a wider horizon than materialists. Much more 
than materialists are they concerned about issues that transcend the narrow interests of 
family, friends, ethnic group or class. From this perspective, postmaterialists are more 
likely than materialists to be genuinely concerned about the well-being of fellow 
citizens or mankind as a whole and express feelings of solidarity and commitment 
towards them. If this is true, postmaterialism is likely to have important consequences 
for the motivations underpinning pro-welfare attitudes. Postmaterialists may well be 
more inspired by social solidarity (quite possibly of a unilateral kind!) than naked 
self-interest in endorsing welfare arrangements. Inglehart indeed proposes that the rise 
of post-materialist values has diminished the salience of economic self-interest vis-a-
vis social solidarity as motivations buttressing pro-welfare attitudes (1990, pp. 252, 
253), but he has not explored this interesting conjecture empirically. The proposition 
is interesting as it runs precisely counter to the prediction of the diversity argument: 
instead of social solidarity being steadily undermined by increasing cultural diversity, 
it is actually becoming stronger because of rising postmaterialism. Social solidarity 
may moreover have changed in nature – from a self-interested reciprocal to a 
disinterested unilateral kind.  
Postmaterialism theory (PM theory) clashes with the diversity argument in 
another important respect. While the latter holds that diversity affects social cohesion 
negatively because trust does not transcend ethnic boundaries, PM theory would not 
see increasing diversity as problematic since postmaterialism entails a positive 
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disposition towards ethno-cultural difference. If PM theory is correct and 
postmaterialists would indeed have positive opinions on immigrants and other distinct 
cultural groups the basic mechanism postulated by the diversity argument no longer 
applies for a growing number of people. In other words, postmaterialism could 
overcome the diversity/solidarity trade-off by combining an appreciation of cultural 
diversity with a sense of solidarity towards more encompassing communities (the 
nation, Europeans, mankind as a whole).   
Interestingly, conceived in this way postmaterialism could also shed light on 
the contradictory findings of some recent studies. Recall that Alesina and Glaeser 
(2004) found a negative relation between racial heterogeneity and social spending 
based on an analysis of 54 countries worldwide. By contrast, Taylor-Gooby found no 
significant relation between social spending and racial diversity using a sample of 21 
European states. Similarly, while Delheye and Newton (2005) discovered a negative 
link between heterogeneity and social trust in an analysis of 57 states across the globe, 
Hooghe et al (2006) found no meaningful links between 28 (!) indicators of diversity 
and social trust in their study of 20 OECD countries. In short, while in an extended 
sample of 50 or more states worldwide the presumed negative effect of diversity can 
indeed be seen, it fails to occur in a sample of western countries. As it is precisely in 
the latter that levels of postmaterialism are relatively high, postmaterialism may have 
prevented the diversity effect from occurring there. Conversely, the relatively strong 
materialist orientations in non-western states may have fuelled the diversity effect. In 
short, there could be an interaction effect between postmaterialism and diversity: in 
contexts with high levels of postmaterialism the diversity effect is neutralised while in 
contexts with weak supplies of postmaterialism diversity shows its negative impact.    
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 Several critical observations can nonetheless be added to the presumed 
positive relation between postmaterialism and social solidarity. First of all, the 
assumption that postmaterialists have the ability to express feelings of solidarity 
towards people of different ethnic stock says nothing about the depth of these 
feelings. Postmaterialists could well not feel the same level of commitment to these 
people as materialists feel to ethnic kin or members of the same religious group. In 
this sense the feelings of connectedness of postmaterialists could well reflect the 
„thin‟ type of bonds characteristic of modern cosmopolitan society while the feelings 
of solidarity of materialists are reminiscent of the durable and thick forms of loyalty 
found in communal society. Thus, there could be tension between the scope and the 
depth of solidarity. Postmaterialism, moreover, has also been associated with 
individualism, a belief in personal autonomy and a dislike of traditional and 
hierarchical institutions (family, church, union, state). Neither of these phenomena is 
seen as conducive to social solidarity. Individualism is often said to be harmful for 
solidarity because it leads to the prioritization of personal interests over those of the 
community (de Beer 2005b). Similarly, the belief in personal autonomy could well 
negatively affect social solidarity if it is closely linked to a conviction of individual 
efficacy and responsibility - i.e. individuals not only have the ability to take matters 
into their own hands, they also have an obligation to do so. In this line of thought, one 
need not feel morally obliged to help less fortunate individuals because these 
individuals owe their misfortune entirely to themselves. Lastly, the dislike of 
authority and traditional forms of association is likely to make postmaterialists ill-
disposed to collective welfare arrangements provided by the state or by the unions. 
Kitschelt (1994) for instance has argued that social democratic parties need to 
downplay their traditional materialist agenda of redistribution and social security and 
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incorporate libertarian orientations in order to appeal to the growing number of 
postmaterialists from the middle classes. In the final section we will examine to what 
extent these reservations are supported empirically.   
 
 
Social solidarity 
 
Finally, we have to clarify what we mean by social solidarity as the dependent 
variable of this study. In our use of the term it exclusively refers to feelings of 
sympathy for and commitment to fellow citizens. We consciously ignore 
manifestations of solidarity targeting subnational groups (family, ethnic group, class) 
or supranational groups (Europeans, mankind as a whole). We only focus on 
solidarity towards fellow citizens because welfare policies are still primarily 
organized at the national level in the vast majority of western states and because the 
claims of the cultural diversity theorists usually relate to the nation as the unit of 
analysis. In view of the critical points noted above we will not measure social 
solidarity by examining attitudes on specific welfare policies since these attitudes may 
reflect self-interest. Rather we will seek to tap social solidarity by assessing support 
for a number of general principles, such as equality and the fulfilment of basic needs, 
by examining opinions on the less fortunate in society (the poor; the unemployed) and 
by exploring the degree of stated engagement with fellow citizens.   
 Until now we have only paid attention to diversity and postmaterialism as 
factors which may influence social solidarity. It goes without saying that solidarity is 
also shaped by many other conditions and processes operating at both the individual 
and collective level.  Similar to postmaterialism, a person‟s education level may, for 
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instance, be positively related to the scope of solidarity as the better educated usually 
have more knowledge and a better understanding of other cultures.  Income level 
might well show a negative relationship with solidarity because the fear of 
redistributive policies could well prevent the rich from expressing sympathy with the 
poor. At the collective level, economic prosperity (as measured by GNP per capita) 
might well be inversely related to social solidarity, for instance because the 
population in affluent societies believes that issues like poverty, social exclusion and 
lack of opportunity no longer have the urgency they once had. In the multilevel 
analyses of the final section we will control for these and other factors, allowing us to 
assess the relative explanatory power of the diversity and postmaterialism 
perspectives. 
 The theoretical conjectures outlined above have led us to formulate the 
following research questions: 
1. Does postmaterialism indeed have the potential to carry trust and feelings of 
affinity across ethnic borders? 
2. Can aggregate trends in social solidarity be discerned and if so, which 
perspective do these trends support? 
3. Which perspective has the upper hand in explaining the variation in social 
solidarity at the individual and aggregate levels, taking other relevant factors 
into account? 
Before scrutinizing these questions in our analyses below we first present the data and 
the sources they were obtained from. 
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Data sources 
We drew on data from various sources to explore the three research questions cross-
nationally and across time. Data of the 1999 wave of the European Values Study 
(EVS) was used to arrive at measurements of postmaterialism, ethnic tolerance, social 
trust and social solidarity at the individual level. The 1999 wave covered 29 European 
countries using nationally representative samples of 1000-2000 respondents in each 
country and providing data suitable for cross-national comparative research (Inglehart 
et al. 2004).  Our analyses in the following section are thus based on data from these 
29 countries. To measure postmaterialism we relied on the ready-made four-item 
index developed by Inglehart (1990) on the basis of factor analysis. This index, with 
values 1 – materialist, 2 – mixed and 3 – postmaterialist, is composed of the following 
items: 
 
 Maintain order in the nation 
 Fight rising prices 
 Give people more say in the decisions of the government 
 Protect freedom of speech 
 
The first two items reflect materialist inclinations, the last two reflect postmaterialist 
attitudes. The postmaterialist index has been criticised for the weak factor loadings of 
the items on which it is based (Davis 1996). In response to this criticism, Abrahamson 
and Inglehart (1996), however, have pointed out that the low factor loadings are the 
by-product of the specific ranking approach they used. A different way of connecting 
the items in the questionnaire (for instance, a rating approach) would have produced 
higher loadings. Moreover, Inglehart (1990: 139) shows that the four items cluster in 
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the same way across many different countries, making the postmaterialist index a 
robust measure in terms of cross-national validity. We tapped trust with the well-
known item “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or 
that you can‟t be too careful in dealing with people?” [1 – you can‟t be too careful; 2 
– most people can be trustedi]. We further developed a measure of ethnic tolerance by 
constructing a scale out of the following four items
ii
: 
 Immigrants and foreign workers mentioned/not-mentioned as unwanted 
neighbours 
 Government should prohibit/allow people from less developed countries to 
come here to work 
 Feeling concerned about the living conditions of immigrants in one‟s country 
 Being prepared to actually do something to improve the living conditions of 
immigrants in one‟s country 
The scale has a minimum of -3.6, denoting intolerance, and a maximum of 4.0, 
denoting tolerance.  
 We finally selected five items from the EVS to represent social solidarity, the 
dependent variable of this paper.  Two of the these items are taken from a question 
asking what a society should provide in order to be considered just: (1) “Eliminating 
big income differences between citizens”, (2) “Guaranteeing that basic needs are met 
for all, in terms of food, housing, cloths, education, health” (answers: 1 - not at all 
important --- 5 - very important). Another taps engagement with fellow citizens: “To 
what extent do you feel concerned about the living conditions of your fellow 
countrymen?” (answers: 1 - not at all --- 5 - very much). The fourth indicator 
measures attitudes on the unemployed:  “How would you place your views on this 
scale? 1 - People who are unemployed should have to take any job available or lose 
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their unemployment benefits --- 10 – People who are unemployed should have the 
right to refuse a job they do not want”. We consider responses approaching the latter 
end of the scale to be indicative of social solidarity. The last item gauges opinions on 
the poor: “Why are there people in this country who live in need? 1 - because of 
laziness of lack of willpower; 2 - because they are unlucky, because of injustice in our 
society or because it‟s an inevitable part of modern progress”iii.  Following Alesina 
and Glaeser (2004) we interpreted the first response on this item as a negative 
indicator of social solidarity. The response scales of all five items are thus in an 
ascending order, i.e. higher values denote more solidarity.  
 Although correlations between the five items are all positive and significant, 
they are not of a magnitude that would justify the claim that the items tap into a 
coherent syndrome that could be called social solidarity. Indeed, a principle 
component analysis (Varimax rotation) on the pooled data produces a two factor 
solution with the first three items loading on one dimension (factor loadings of .74, 
.72 and .42, respectively) and the last two items loading on a second dimension 
(factor loadings of .72 and .78).  In view of the semantic content of the items, we 
labelled the first dimension „support for general solidarity principles‟ and the second 
dimension „compassion for the unfortunate‟. These two dimensions will constitute the 
dependent variables in subsequent multilevel analyses (see results section). This does 
not mean, however, that we are claiming social solidarity to be a bi-dimensional 
phenomenon. We only make use of these dimensions to reduce data complexity. 
Social solidarity, in our opinion, should be understood as a fairly loose concept 
embracing a variety of meanings. 
 Specifically to assess trends in social solidarity (i.e. the second research 
question) we compiled data from four editions of the Eurobarometer series (editions 
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5, 31A, 40 and 56.1) using the item “Why in your opinion are there people who live in 
need”. This item has the same response categories as the item in the EVS on poverty. 
Similar to the EVS, the Eurobarometer relies on nationally representative samples of 
1000-2000 respondents. As the Eurobarometer is restricted to EU member states, our 
analysis of trends only include the original EU six plus United Kingdom, Ireland and 
Denmark 
 Diversity, the other explanatory variable of interest, was gauged with three 
indicators - ethnic heterogeneity, the percentage of immigrants in the population in 
2000, and the change in the percentage of immigrants from 1990 to 2000 – all three of 
which relate to the national level. We borrowed data on ethnic heterogeneity from 
Alesina et al (2003), using their Ethnic Fractionalization construct. This construct 
takes both the number of ethnic groups and the size of each group into account and 
reflects the chance that two randomly chosen individuals from a national population 
belong to different groups.
iv
 The values of this measure range from 0 (maximum 
homogeneity) to 1 (maximum heterogeneity). Specific about Alesina‟s conception of 
ethnic fractionalization is that it incorporates both linguistic and racial distinctions to 
account for situations in which different ethnic groups speak the same language (as in 
many Latin American countries). The data for the second and third indicator were 
derived from UN statistics on people of migrant stock (see 
http://esa.un.org/migration/). These statistics represent the percentage of the 
population born abroad and thus have the drawback of only capturing the first 
generation of migrants. They do ensure good cross-national comparability, however. 
We added the third indicator to explore whether increases in diversity have a greater 
impact on solidarity attitudes than diversity levels. It is after all conceivable that 
people are much more alarmed by changes in their surroundings than by stable 
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features of their environment with which they have learnt to cope (Hooghe et al. 
2006). To our knowledge no other indices of diversity are available that cover all 
European countries.  It needs to be emphasized that the three measures of diversity 
need not run parallel to one another. For instance, ethnic heterogeneity is high and 
immigrant numbers are low in multi-ethnic states with emigration surpluses (e.g. 
Romania, Ukraine, Russia). Similarly, countries with relatively small immigrant 
communities may have recently become immigration societies experiencing 
substantial inflows of migrants (Spain and Greece are good examples). Lastly, we 
relied on GDP per capita (1995) as a measure of economic prosperity.  
Table 1 shows the country aggregate scores on all measures. The data on 
postmaterialism and on the two solidarity outcomes represent national means. It can 
be seen that there are substantial differences between countries on almost all measures 
across Europe. There are also noticeable cross-regional differences. On average 
Eastern countries are significantly more ethnically diverse than Western countries. 
Western states by contrast have higher proportions of immigrants, though the 
difference with Eastern states is not significant. The former have also experienced a 
net influx of migrants whereas the latter have become more homogenous in terms of 
the percentage of people born abroad.  Unsurprisingly, the West also has significantly 
higher levels of postmaterialism and economic prosperity than the East. On the social 
solidarity indicators the cross-national variation seems to be more important than the 
cross-regional one as there are no significant differences between East and West.   
 
 
Table 1 about here 
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Analyses and results 
 
Postmaterialism and the scope of solidarity 
To assess the first research question optimally we would need survey items asking 
respondents whether they trust (or identify with) compatriots of a different ethnic 
background as much as they do (with) co-ethnics. To our knowledge, however, no 
such questions have ever been asked in the major surveys. Instead we relied on items 
tapping ethnic tolerance and social trust as a means to explore whether 
postmaterialism transcends ethnic boundaries. Our measurements of postmaterialism, 
ethnic tolerance and social trust have been discussed in the previous section.  
We postulate that if postmaterialism carries trust and solidarity across ethnic 
borders it should at least be positively related to both ethnic tolerance and social trust. 
We explored this hypothesis with linear and logistic regression analyses of the pooled 
EVS data using ethnic tolerance and trust as the dependent variables and 
postmaterialism, education, income, gender and age as the independent variables. The 
results show that postmaterialism is indeed positively related to both ethnic tolerance 
and trust controlling for the other explanatory variables (see Table 2). Judging from 
the t statistics of the linear regression analysis and the B coefficients in combination 
with the standard errors of the logistic regression analysis, the effect of 
postmaterialism moreover is quite strong in comparison to the effects of the control 
variables. What is more, these effects have cross-regional validity as they can be 
observed in both Western and Eastern Europe.
v
 In short, although existing survey data 
do not allow us to unambiguously prove that postmaterialists are blind to racial and 
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ethnic divisions, the strong positive links between postmaterialism and ethnic 
tolerance and trust do offer us important clues in that direction. 
 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
 
Trends in social solidarity   
Our assessment of the second research question is also handicapped. Ideally, we 
would need longitudinal data spanning a considerable period with sufficient points of 
measurement in time and including a wide range of countries. The Eurobarometer has 
repeatedly included the item on the reasons for poverty (see previous section), and it 
is, to our knowledge, the only survey with an item on social solidarity stretching as far 
back as 1976. But its drawback is that it includes only the nine countries mentioned 
before.  
Nonetheless, the Eurobarometer trend data on the reasons of poverty do allow 
us to draw provisional conclusions as to the explanatory power of the diversity and 
postmaterialism perspectives. If diversity negatively affects social solidarity, we 
would expect to see declining sympathy for the poor since the societies of the nine 
countries included in the Eurobarometer have all become more ethnically diverse over 
the last 30 years (see for instance Figure 1 in Putnam (2006, p. 139) displaying rising 
immigrant numbers in selected OECD countries). By contrast, if the postmaterialism 
perspective is correct, we should see a more forgiving attitude towards the poor over 
time since postmaterialism levels have steadily risen from the 1960s as Inglehart has 
amply demonstrated in his books (see, e.g. Inglehart and Welzel 2005; 132). As 
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Figure 1 shows, trends in opinions about the poor clearly support the postmaterialism 
perspective. Almost everywhere people have become less judgmental of the poor over 
time, rather than more as the diversity theory would predict. Only Denmark shows a 
small increase in the percentage of people thinking that the poor owe it to themselves 
that they are poor. Nonetheless, despite the overall trend towards greater sympathy for 
the poor over a period stretching from 1976 to 2001, negative opinions on the poor are 
on the rise again in six countries since 1993. We would need more data on social 
solidarity to state with any measure of certainty whether 1993 constitutes a watershed 
year marking the beginning of a reverse trend or whether 2001 is simply an upward 
fluctuation in a continuing downward trend. In any case, while acknowledging that 
social solidarity is shaped by many more factors than postmaterialism and diversity 
alone, the trend data of Figure 1 clearly lend more support for the former than for the 
latter. If the negative impact of diversity had been as strong as its advocates claim it 
is, we should have seen declining instead of rising levels of sympathy for the poor.  
 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
We can also explore the relationship between the two rival theories and solidarity by 
analysing cross-sectionally at the national level whether changes in diversity and/or 
postmaterialism are linked to changes in social solidarity. Obviously, if the diversity 
argument holds, one would expect countries showing drastic increases in diversity to 
also show dramatic declines in social solidarity. We used the aforementioned UN data 
on migrant stock 1990-2000 as a measure of diversity change. We turned again to the 
EVS to find measures of changes in postmaterialism and in social solidarity. Although 
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the EVS does not cover as large a time span as the Eurobarometer, it does have data 
on two solidarity items (reasons for poverty and opinions on unemployed) and on the 
four-item postmaterialism index for the 1990 and 1999 waves for as many as 26 
countries. We could thus construct three measures of change covering a nine-year 
period: (1) a measure reflecting the change in the percentage of people not mentioning 
laziness as a reason for poverty; (2) a measure indicating the change in country means 
in opinions on the unemployed (with positive values indicating that people have 
become more sympathetic towards the unemployed); (3) a measure indicating the 
change in country means of postmaterialism. Lastly, we collected data representing 
the annual economic growth rate over the 1990-2000 period for 18 countries. 
 Simple bivariate correlations at the country level show that increases in 
diversity are not linked to decreases in social solidarity (see Table 3). To the contrary, 
changes in diversity are actually positively related to the dynamics in opinions on the 
unemployed as one of the solidarity measures. That is, people in countries with 
increasing immigrant numbers have adopted more lenient attitudes towards the 
unemployed over time, not less. Also in these analyses therefore, we could not find 
any support for the diversity perspective. Intriguingly, Banting et al (2006) did find a 
negative correlation between growth in the percentage of immigrants and changes in 
social solidarity. Their indicator of social solidarity however was the percentage of 
GDP spent on social welfare. As we noted before, this may not be an appropriate 
indicator as the degree of social spending may well reflect the power of interest 
groups, or perhaps the strength of the economy, rather than the bonds between 
citizens. In the case of Banting‟s findings it is, for instance, conceivable that 
economic growth was the key factor driving both the rise in immigrant numbers (by 
attracting foreigners in search of jobs) and the decline in social spending (by creating 
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more employment and thus reducing the appeals on social benefits). The discrepancy 
between our findings and those of Banting et al thus nicely illustrates our point that 
solidarity attitudes and social spending levels should not be be treated as synonyms.   
The absence of a link between the dynamics of diversity and solidarity does 
not mean, however, that postmaterialism or other perspectives perform any better in 
accounting for changes in solidarity attitudes. To the contrary, the correlations of 
Table 3 do not show any meaningful relationship between changes in solidarity 
attitudes and changes in postmaterialism and economic growth either. Thus, the 
dynamics of social solidarity attitudes, at least for the 1990-2000 period, seem to defy 
any plausible explanation.  
 
Cross-sectional analyses of social solidarity 
Since the dependent variables are measured at the individual level and the explanatory 
variables of interest are pitched at both the individual level (postmaterialism) and 
national level (diversity), the appropriate method to explore the co-variates of social 
solidarity is a multi-level analysis. Faced with explanatory variables at different 
levels, some research has simply attributed the values of some higher level variables 
to all lower level units in order to conduct an ordinary multiple regression analysis 
(e.g. Berry et al. 2006). This, however, leads to an overestimation of the effect of 
higher level variables. Moreover, a multiple regression model requires that 
observations are independent of one another, and it is precisely this requirement that 
the data of international surveys violate (Hooghe et al, 2006). After all, these data are 
based on national samples, and citizens of one country usually have more in common 
with fellow citizens than with citizens of another state. International surveys thus have 
a two-tier nested structure with country as the first order unit by which respondents 
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were selected in a non-random fashion. Multilevel analysis takes this nested structure 
into account. Using Mlwin software we will build a random intercept model, which 
means that we allow the intercepts of the regression coefficients of the individual 
level variables to vary between countries.  
 We entered postmaterialism, education level, income level, age and gender as 
the individual-level explanatory variables in the model. GDP per capita and the three 
diversity indicators were introduced as country-level variables. We regressed the two 
social solidarity dimensions on this collection of explanatory variables, running a 
separate model for each diversity indicator. Table 4 presents the results of these 
analyses. It was ensured that none of the explanatory variables exceeded collinearity 
thresholds. We further note that postmaterialism and social solidarity in our 
understanding are notions with a considerable conceptual overlap. Therefore, in our 
analyses below we do not aim to explore whether postmaterialism causes social 
solidarity (as if they were entirely distinct concepts) but whether social solidarity is 
part of the mindset of postmaterialists controlling for the other variables.  
 Critics might argue that there is an imbalance in our research design in that 
postmaterialism is entered as an individual variable while diversity is included as a 
series of contextual variables. As significant effects are much more likely to be found 
at the individual level, the design would give the postmaterialism perspective more 
chance of being supported.  To create a level playing field one should, in this logic, 
enter a contextual measure for postmaterialism and an individual-level indicator for 
diversity. While acknowledging the asymmetry in our design, we would, however, 
maintain that a balanced design with indicators at both levels would not do justice to 
the theoretical substance of the two perspectives. Inglehart‟s theory of postmaterialist 
value change is essentially pitched at the individual level: it is because of increasing 
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prosperity that individuals develop postmaterialist values. Aggregate levels of 
postmaterialism are seen as a mere compositional condition (i.e. reflecting the sum of 
individual value preferences), not as a contextual condition exerting an independent 
effect on some social phenomenon on top of individual-level postmaterialism. By 
contrast, ethnic diversity is only conceptualised as a contextual effect in the diversity 
literature, i.e. as a group-level effect that cannot be reduced to the properties of the 
group‟s members. It would thus make little sense to explore it as an individual-level 
variable. This being said, we will compare the two perspectives at the same level of 
analysis in Table 5 using aggregate measures of postmaterialism and solidarity. If 
postmaterialism is a very important driver of solidarity at the individual level, the 
same link should be visible at the aggregate level. In this way, the two perspectives 
can be tested under equal conditions. 
 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
 
Let us now turn to the results of the multilevel analyses (Table 4). It appears that none 
of the three diversity measures is related with either of the two solidarity outcomes 
controlling for GDP per capita and the five individual level conditions. One of these 
measures, ethnic fractionalization, is even close to showing a significant positive link 
with compassion for the unfortunate, which is a finding that runs completely counter 
to the diversity hypothesis. Admittedly, the number of countries on which these 
relations are based is not large (27), making it difficult for context variables such as 
the diversity measures to achieve statistical significance. Yet this number is 
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apparently not too small for GDP per capita, the other context variable, to show a 
significant negative link with support for general solidarity principles. In other words, 
while diversity levels and changes in diversity do not seem to matter, economic 
prosperity does have an impact in a sense richer countries display lower solidarity 
levels.  This supports our earlier supposition that people in affluent countries may 
simply not find issues of social solidarity as important and urgent as people in poorer 
societies do.  
Compared to the macro-level variables the individual level variables appear to 
be more closely related to the solidarity indicators. In general women and the well-
educated report higher levels of altruism than men and the poorly educated. Higher 
incomes, by contrast, express lower levels of solidarity than low incomes. These 
relationships are by and large in line with the expectations discussed above. Age does 
not show a consistent link with the two solidarity outcomes. Older people are more 
supportive of general solidarity principles but show less sympathy for the socially 
marginalised. Yet, the more interesting finding for this study is that, postmaterialism, 
does not show a regular pattern of relationships either. Although postmaterialists 
express significantly more compassion for the unfortunate than materialists do, they 
are not significantly more supportive of general solidarity principles.   
Why is there no consistent link between postmaterialism and the two social 
solidarity outcomes? This undoubtedly partly has to do with the variety of meanings 
that the outcome measures tap, as we explained above. However, the lack of 
consistency may also be related to the different historical experiences of the countries 
that participated in the EVS. Diverging historical backgrounds may have led 
respondents in Eastern and Western Europe, for instance, to interpret the principles of 
basic needs provision and the containment of large socio-economic inequalities 
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(which are both components of the general principles outcome measure) in different 
ways. While these principles are likely to have become tainted in post-communist 
countries in a sense that are associated with the rhetoric of the former authoritarian 
regime, they may carry positive connotations for West-Europeans, who could well 
interpret them as part of the social justice agenda of mainstream socio-democratic 
parties. If this conjecture is true, postmaterialism could well be related completely 
differently to both principles across the two regions. To test whether this is the case 
we performed the same multilevel analyses for both regions separately (see bottom 
half of Table 4). We indeed see that postmaterialism has a strong negative effect on 
support for general solidarity principles in Eastern Europe while it is positively linked 
to this outcome in Western Europe. The relation with compassion for the unfortunate, 
the other outcome, does not vary by region (i.e. all positive). Postmaterialism thus 
shows a consistent positive link with solidarity in Western Europe, but not in Eastern 
Europe.  
Intriguingly, the regional split up also sheds light, albeit a confusing one, on 
the interaction effect between postmaterialism and diversity. As we conjectured 
above, the diversity effect could well be neutralised in environments with high stocks 
of postmaterialism given the propensity of postmaterialists to look beyond ethnic 
boundaries. Consequently, the negative effect of diversity on solidarity should above 
all be visible in materialist surroundings. As it happens, Eastern and Western Europe 
differ substantially in levels of postmaterialism: materialism prevails in the former 
while more mixed value orientations predominate in the latter (see discussion of Table 
1). We should thus expect to see a strong negative link between diversity and solidary 
in Eastern Europe and a weak link or no link at all in Western Europe. Our analyses 
only confirm this hypothesis for the first outcome measure: indeed we see an (almost 
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significant) negative relation between ethnic heterogeneity and support for general 
solidary principles in Eastern Europe and a weak positive link in Western Europe. A 
completely different pattern emerges on compassion for the unfortunate, however. 
Contrary to our expectation, ethnic heterogeneity shows a significant positive (!) link 
with this outcome measure in Eastern Europe and a weak positive relation in Western 
Europe. Moreover, there is also a fairly strong positive connection between the 
proportion of immigrants and compassion for the unfortunate in Eastern Europe. We 
can only speculate on the reasons for the sharply diverging patterns between the two 
outcome measures. Possibly, respondents in Eastern Europe had members of their 
own ethnic group in mind rather than anonymous fellow citizens when they were 
asked to give their opinions on the poor and unemployed. Alternatively, the economic 
slump following the collapse of communism may have been so profound and 
encompassing that people had every reason to blame economic changes or „corrupt 
politicians‟ for widespread poverty and (hidden) unemployment and not the people 
afflicted by these hardships themselves. Finally, the unexpected results could simply 
be a reflection of the small number of countries on which the regional analyses are 
based (east – 13 coutnries; west – 14 countries), with outliers determining the 
patterns. 
 In sum, our findings are not consistent with the diversity perspective. They do 
offer considerable support for the postmaterialism perspective but this support is 
region-specific as it pertains to Western Europe (and possibly to other western states 
as well). We further note that the individual-level variables do not perform well in 
terms of accounting for the variance associated with that level (see the small 
percentages of explained variance in Table 4).
vi
 This indicates that any (positive) 
impact of postmaterialism on social solidarity may well be dwarfed by the (negative) 
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influence of other factors not included in the analyses. Our findings on 
postmaterialism, incidentally, are in line with those of a study focusing on the link 
between postmaterialism and support for public welfare policies. Drawing on a 
sample of party members and activists of the English Canadian Social Democrats, this 
study found postmaterialism to be positively correlated with support for social 
programs, fiscal progressivism, and decommodification (Erickson and Laycock 
2002).  
We have to end with another qualification of the postmaterialism perspective. 
So far we have examined the co-variates of social solidarity at the individual level but 
it is entirely feasible that different relationships obtain at the aggregate level. This is 
all the more likely if much of the variance in individual level analyses is left 
unaccounted for, as is the case in our multilevel analyses. We therefore examined 
whether the positive link between postmaterialism and social solidarity (and the non-
relation between diversity and social solidarity) also obtains at the national level (see 
Table 5; the correlations are based on the aggregate data displayed in Table 1). Due to 
the small number of observations and collinearity problems we restricted ourselves to 
bivariate correlations. Postmaterialism turns out not to be positively correlated with 
either of the two solidarity outcomes (we even see negative correlations although 
these are not significant). In other words, societies with high levels of postmaterialism 
are not necessarily more altruistic. Evidently, there are forces at work that depress the 
solidarity levels of both materialists and postmaterialists in countries with 
comparatively high levels of postmaterialism. Economic prosperity could clearly be 
one of them judging from the negative correlations of GDP per capita with the two 
outcome measures, particularly with support.for general solidarity principles. 
However, the absence of a positive relation between postmaterialism and solidarity at 
 34 
 
 
the aggregate level could also be indicative of the shallowness of the feelings of 
solidarity of postmaterialists. As noted before, the attachments that postmaterialists 
feel towards fellow citizens (or towards people of even wider communities such as 
fellow Europeans or global citizens) are likely to be of a thinner, less committed kind 
than the bonds that unite people of the same family, ethnic group, religious group or 
class to one another. Seen in this light, it is likely that other processes have overruled 
the effect of postmaterialism on solidarity at the aggregate level.  The table further 
shows that the three diversity indicators are not related to the two solidarity outcomes 
at the aggregate level either. Thus the diversity perspective is not supported by any of 
our analyses.  
 
Table 4 about here  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Many scholars have argued that people will only be prepared to help others if they 
feel they have something in common with these others. In other words, social 
solidarity is based on a sense of community. In this logic growing diversity will 
undermine social solidarity because it erodes interpersonal trust and communal 
cohesion. The current paper has not produced empirical evidence for this theory. First, 
it was not supported by time series data. The diversity argument would expect an anti-
welfare ideology showing little mercy with the poor to have risen in societies that 
have become increasingly diverse due to ongoing immigration. Immigration societies, 
however, have become more sympathetic to the poor across the board from the mid 
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1970s onwards. Second, it found no confirmation in cross-sectional analyses of the 
dynamics of diversity and solidarity. Countries with increasing levels of diversity did 
not show corresponding declines in solidarity. Third, the diversity argument could not 
be substantiated at the individual level. In none of the six multilevel analyses covering 
27 European countries could a relation be found between three indicators of diversity 
and two outcome measures of social solidarity controlling for other macro and micro-
level variables. Finally, no link could be observed at the macro-level between 
diversity and aggregate measures of social solidarity. 
   This article proposed Inglehart‟s theory of postmaterialist value change as a 
promising alternative perspective on social solidarity. Theoretically the link between 
postmaterialism and social solidarity is explained by the tendency of postmaterialists 
to have wider horizons and feel committed to values such as freedom and a just and 
fair society for all. Moreover, the open and explorative posture of postmaterialists 
often translates into positive appraisals of cultural difference, enabling them to look 
beyond ethnic boundaries and extend feelings of attachment to broader communities. 
Postmaterialism theory thus offers a meaningful explanation of why people can retain 
a sense of solidarity towards fellow citizens under conditions of growing diversity. 
Our analyses showed that postmaterialism is positively linked to ethnic tolerance and 
interpersonal trust which confirmed our conjecture that postmaterialism helps to 
bridge ethnic divisions. Most importantly, postmaterialism showed a strong positive 
connection with compassion for the unfortunate.at the individual level. 
 However, several reservations prevent us from seeing postmaterialism as the 
panacea for all societal ills. First, because we relied on analyses of cross-sectional 
data we, obviously, cannot make statements about the causal order. It is quite 
imaginable, for instance, that diversity not only shapes social solidarity but that social 
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solidarity in its turn positively contributes to diversity in a sense that immigrants 
prefer to settle in countries with relatively high stocks of social solidarity. Second, we 
found the link between postmaterialism and social solidarity to vary by region, with 
postmaterialism being negatively correlated to support for general solidarity 
principles in Eastern Europe. Postmaterialism may thus have different consequences 
in different contexts. This should caution those who understand postmaterialism as a 
welcome process of value change having the same positive effects everywhere. We 
postulated that the communist past has made issues of social solidarity more 
controversial in Eastern Europe leading postmaterialists there to sharply reject 
principles associated with or advocated by the former authoritarian regime. Third, if 
postmaterialism had the potential to dissolve ethnic divides, we would expect to see 
no relation between diversity and solidarity in environments with high levels of 
postmaterialism and a strong negative relation in contexts with high levels of 
materialism. However, a comparison of East- and West-European countries revealed 
that diversity is not more negatively linked to solidarity in materialist surroundings. 
Fourth,  although postmaterialism is positively related to social solidarity (certainly in 
Western Europe), it contributes little to explaining the variance in social solidarity at 
the individual level. Moreover, at the aggregate level postmaterialism is not linked to 
social solidarity.  All of this suggests that the feelings of solidarity of postmaterialists 
may well be too thin and too fleeting to sustain comprehensive national welfare 
regimes. We have to end with the unsatisfactory conclusion that other processes not 
considered in this study are likely to have a much greater impact on social solidarity 
than rising levels of postmaterialism. 
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Figure 1. Opinions about the causes of poverty  
    (percentage saying “people are poor because of  laziness or lack of  
               willpower”)  
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Eurobarometers 5, 31A, 40 and 56.1. Question in surveys: “Why in your opinion are 
               there people who live in need? Here are four opinions – which is the closest to 
               yours?” 1- because they have been unlucky; 2 – because of laziness and lack of 
               willpower; 3 – because there is too much injustice in our society; 4 – it’s an evitable 
               part of modern progress; 5 – none of these 
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Table 1. Postmaterialism, diversity and social solidarity levels in European countries  
 
   Diversity Social solidarity 
Count
ry 
GNP 
per 
capita  
(1995) 
Post-
material
ism 
Ethnic 
fractio-
naliza-
tion 
% of pop 
of migrant 
stock 
2000 
Change in % 
of pop of 
migrant stock 
1990-2000 
Support for 
general 
solidarity 
principles 
Compassion 
for the 
unfortunate 
Au 26890,00 2.21      ,11    15,10 5.30 6.80 6.60 
Bel 24710,00 2.03      ,56     6,90 -.50 7.00 7.10 
Bul  1330,00 1.58      ,40     1,30 .90 7.00 7.20 
Bela  2070,00 1.57      ,32    12,20 .40 7.10 7.20 
Cro  3250,00 2.09      ,37    14,50 3.20 7.20 7.20 
Cze  3870,00 1.85      ,32     4,40 .30 6.60 6.60 
Den 29890,00 2.08      ,08     7,20 1.40 5.90 7.10 
Est  2860,00 1.62      ,51    15,20 -5.80 6.80 7.50 
Fin 20580,00 1.85      ,13     3,00 1.40 6.90 7.10 
Fra 24990,00 1.90      ,10    10,70 .20 7.00 7.10 
Ger 27510,00 1.84      ,17    12,30 4.40 7.10 6.80 
Gre  8210,00 1.98      ,16     8,80 2.60 7.40 7.10 
Hun  4120,00 1.53      ,15     3,10 -.50 7.30 6.80 
Ice 26215,00 1.89      ,08     7,80 2.10 7.20 7.00 
Ire 14710,00 1.93      ,12    14,10 3.60 7.20 7.20 
Ita 19020,00 2.14      ,11     4,30 .40 7.00 6.70 
Lv  2270,00 1.70      ,59    19,50 -7.00 7.10 7.10 
Lt  1900,00 1.80      ,32     4,80 -3.30 7.20 7.30 
Mal  9330,00 1.72      ,04     2,70 .60 6.70 6.70 
Neth 24000,00 2.11      ,11    10,10 1.80 6.50 7.30 
Pol  2790,00 1.68      ,12     1,80 -.90 7.30 6.80 
Por  9700,00 1.76      ,05     7,30 1.80 . . 
Rom   1480,00 1.62      ,31      ,60 .00 7.20 6.90 
Rus  2240,00 1.48      ,25     8,40 .30 6.90 7.30 
Sv  2950,00 1.58      ,25     2,30 1.40 7.50 6.70 
Slove  8200,00 1.99      ,22     8,50 -.30 7.30 6.50 
Sp 13580,00 1.97      ,42    11,10 2.10 7.30 6.90 
Swe 23750,00 2.16      ,06    12,40 2.10 6.80 7.00 
Ukr  1630,00 1.57      ,47    14,70 .40 . . 
GB 18700,00       ,12     9,10 1.50 . . 
        
East   2925 1.69 .33 7.95 -.78 7.12 7.01 
West 21318 1.97 .17 10.61 1.93 6.91 6.98 
Differe
nce 
-18392 
*** 
-.28***     .16** -2.66    -2.70** .21 .03 
 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
 
„East‟ includes Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine. 
„West‟ includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Great Britain. 
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Table 2. Postmaterialism, ethnic tolerance and social trust 
Co-variates Ethnic tolerance  
(linear regression) 
Social trust 
(logistic regression) 
 Beta-coefficient t value B coefficient Standard Error 
Postmaterialism .132*** 22.10 .416*** .021 
Income level .017** 2.65 .112*** .017 
Education level .137***  21.29 .117*** .006 
Age .013* 2.05 .007*** .001 
Gender (0-man; 
1-woman) 
.054*** 9.23 -.061* .025 
R
2 
.044  .047 (Nagelkerke)  
 
Note: The effects of the co-variates did not exceed critical collinearity thresholds. 
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Table 3. The dynamics of diversity, postmaterialism and social solidarity (bivariate 
correlations at the national level) 
 
 Social solidarity 
 Change in the percentage 
of people not mentioning 
laziness as reason why 
people are living in need 
1990 - 1999 
Change in country average 
of opinions on 
unemployed 
1990-1999 
Change in % of pop of 
migrant stock 1990-2000 
-.08 
(26) 
.40* 
(26) 
Change in mean levels of 
postmaterialism1990-1999 
-.09 
(26) 
01 
(26) 
Average annual economic 
growth 1990-2000 
-.24 
(18) 
.16 
(18) 
 
NB: The N is given in parentheses 
 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
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Table 5. Correlates of social solidarity at the national level 
 
 Social solidarity 
 Support for general 
solidarity principles 
Compassion for the 
unfortunate 
Ethnic fractionalization .21 .33 
% pop of migrant stock -.07 .32 
Change 1990-2000 -.03 -.30 
Postmaterialism -.31 -.16 
GDP per capita 1995 -.44* -.09 
 
NB: The N of all correlations is 27 countries 
 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
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Table 4. Multilevel analyses of social solidarity 
 Social solidarity (all countries) 
Covariates Support for general solidarity principles  Compassion for the unfortunate 
Micro (L1) N=25325 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Postmaterialism -.011  (.01)  
 
same 
 
 
same 
 .133***  (.010)  
 
same 
 
 
same 
Income level -.034***  (.003)  -.024***  (.003) 
Education level -.011**  (.003)  .035***  (.003) 
Age .005***  (.000)  -.006***  (.000) 
Gender .101***  (.012)  .05**  (.012) 
Macro  (L2)  N=27    
GDP per capita -.013*  (.006) -.013*  (.005) -.018*  (.006)  .000  (.005) -.005  (.005) .001  (.005) 
Ethnic fract. -.085  (.413)  - -  .565  (.343) - - 
% pop of migrant st - .002  (.011) -  - .014  (.010) - 
% change 1990-2000 - - .038  (.023)  - - -.035  (.020) 
        
Variance L1 89.8% same same  93.2% same same 
Variance L2 10.2%  6.8% 
% L1 var  explained 2.5% 2.5% 2.5%  2.8% 2.8% 2.8% 
% L2 var explained 18.3% 18.3% 26%  14.7% 13.2 16.2% 
    
 Eastern Europe (Micro: N=12900 ;  Macro: N=13)  Western Europe (Micro: N=12425 ; Macro: N=14) 
 Support for general solidarity princ Compassion for the unfortunate  Support for general sol princ Compassion for the unfortunate 
Micro ( L1) Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef  Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef 
Postmaterialism -.117*** (.015)  
 
same 
.08** (.016)  
 
same 
 .087** (.015)  
 
same 
.179*** (.014)  
 
same 
Income level -.034*** (.004) -.027***(.004)  -.031*** (.004 -.022** (.004) 
Education level -.022** (.004) .023** (.005)  -.003 (.005) .047*** (.005) 
Age .007*** (.001) -.008***(.001)  .003* (.001) -.004** (.001) 
Gender .099*** (.016) .009 (.017)  .094** (.017) .093** (.016) 
Macro (L2)      
GDP per capita -.002 (.009) .006  -.002 .004  (.01) -.008 .002  -.029* (.012) -.034* -.031* .002 (.009) .002 .002 
Ethnic fract. -.830 (.479) - - 1.09* (.54) - -  .685 (.551) - - .155 (.434) - - 
% pop of migrant st. - -.01  - - .02 -  - .029 - - -.002 - 
% change 1990-2000 - - .026 - - -.028  - - .034 - - -.052 
Note: standard errors are given in parentheses; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
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End notes 
                                                 
i
 We reversed the scores in the original database to ensure that an ascending order of response 
categories represents growing trust. 
ii
 Factor analysis showed that these items load on one dimension.  Cronbach‟s Alphas for this scale 
ranged from .526 to .731 across the 27-European states that we selected for the analysis, indicating that 
the scale has good cross-national validity.. 
iii
 We transformed the four response categories in the original database into two response categories to 
create an ascending order reflecting growing solidarity. 
iv
  See Alesina et al (2003) for the formula to compute this measure of diversity. 
v 
The results of the region-specific analyses can be obtained from the author. 
vi
 At first sight it would seem that the proportion of variance explained by the macro-level variables is 
much higher. This proportion however relates only to the macro-level (or between-country) variance, 
which is just a fraction of the within country (or individual-level) variance. This means that in terms of 
reducing the total variance, the macro-level variables do not perform as well as the individual-level 
ones.  
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